Mean Field Equilibria for Resource Competition in Spatial Settings by Yang, Pu et al.
Mean Field Equilibria for Competitive Exploration in Resource
Sharing Settings
Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter Frazier
August 17, 2018
Abstract
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-
specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and
traditional location-based economic activity. This model comprises a group of agents and a
single location endowed with a dynamic stochastic resource process. Periodically, each agent
derives a reward determined by the location’s resource level and the number of other agents
there, and has to decide whether to stay at the location or move. Upon moving, the agent
arrives at a different location whose dynamics are independent and identical to the original
location. Using the methodology of mean field equilibrium, we study the equilibrium behavior
of the agents as a function of the dynamics of the stochastic resource process and the nature
of the competition among co-located agents. We show that an equilibrium exists, where each
agent decides whether to switch locations based only on their current location’s resource level
and the number of other agents there. We additionally show that when an agent’s payoff
is decreasing in the number of other agents at her location, equilibrium strategies obey a
simple threshold structure. We show how to exploit this structure to compute equilibria
numerically, and use these numerical techniques to study how system structure affects the
agents’ collective ability to explore their domain to find and effectively utilize resource-rich
areas.
1 Introduction
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying stochastic
location-specific resources. Such multi-agent systems arise in many real-world settings, as illus-
trated below.
They arise in the sharing economy, in crowd-sourced transportation services like Uber and
Lyft, and in crowdsourced food delivery services like GrubHub and DoorDash, in which drivers
choose neighborhoods and then earn money based on the number of riders or eaters requesting
service within that neighborhood (the location-specific resource), and the number of other drivers
working there. This overall resource level varies stochastically as demand rises and falls, and
the resource derived by a driver decreases as more drivers drive in her neighborhood.
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They also arise in the traditional economy, for example in mobile food vendors deciding where
to locate their trucks; in pastoralists deciding where to graze their livestock; and in fishermen
deciding where to fish. In these examples, the level of resource derived by each agent from their
location (whether profit from hungry passers by, or food for livestock provided by the range-land,
or profit from the catch) depends both on the number of other agents at the location, and on
the location’s stochastically varying resource level.
They also arise in online communities like Reddit and Twitch, in which participants choose
sub-communities or channels and then derive enjoyment depending both on some underlying but
transitory societal interest in the sub-community’s topic of focus (the overall resource) and the
number of other participants in the sub-community. When the number of other participants is
too small, lack of social interaction prevents enjoyment; when the number of other participants
is too large, crowding diminishes the sense of community.
They even arise among scientific researchers, who choose a research area in which to work
and derive value based on the underlying level of societal interest and funding in their chosen
area, and in the number of other researchers working in it. As with online communities, the
number of other researchers should be neither too large nor too small to maximize the value
derived.
In each of these examples, the overall welfare of the system is determined by how agents
explore their domain to find and exploit resource-rich locations. This willingness to explore in
turn depends on the level of competition or co-operation among agents at the same location,
and the distribution of agents and resources across locations.
In this paper, we develop a formal model to analyze such spatio-temporal competition among
agents and the equilibrium behavior of such systems. The model we study comprises a single
location and a group of agents. This location represents one in a large collection of locations
between which the agents move. It has a resource level that varies stochastically with time. Each
agent at the location periodically obtains a payoff whose amount is determined by the number
of other agents currently at the location, and the location’s current resource level. Based on
these quantities, the agent then decides whether to stay at the same location or leave. Upon
leaving the agent receives a reward that represents the expected future discounted payoff that
would be obtained by moving to another randomly chosen location in the system. The agents
are fully strategic and seek to maximize the total expected payoff over their lifetime.
Using the methodology of mean field equilibrium, we study the equilibrium behavior of the
agents in this system as a function of the dynamics of the spatio-temporal resource process and
the level of competition in the agents’ sharing of a location’s resources. We prove the existence of
an equilibrium for general resource-sharing functions. For the specific case where the resource-
sharing function is non-increasing in the number of agents at the location, we further show that
the equilibrium strategy has a simple threshold structure, in which it is optimal for an agent to
leave a location when the number of other agents there exceeds a threshold that depends on the
location’s resource level. This result enables a simple description of equilibrium strategies, and
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allows us to efficiently compute an equilibrium.
Using numerical analysis of a setting with two resource levels and decreasing resource-sharing
function, we investigate how the equilibrium welfare depends on resource levels’ rate of change
and the density of agents. Here, the equilibrium welfare is the sum of payoffs earned across all
agents in equilibrium, normalized to the length of time over which these payoffs have accrued and
either the number of agents or the number of locations. Using this methodology we show qual-
itatively different system behavior when the single-location welfare function (the contribution
to welfare from all agents at one location) increases with the number of agents at the location
as compared with when it decreases. Our ability to derive these and other insights discussed in
detail in Section 5 provide evidence that our model and equilibrium notion lend themselves to
analysis through simple numerical methods. Specifically, our methodology presents a promising
approach to evaluate engineering interventions, such as providing subsidies to or imposing costs
on agents to promote or discourage exploration to improve welfare.
1.1 Related Work
Our work contributes to the literature on mean field equilibrium (Adlakha et al. , 2015; Huang
et al. , 2007; Jovanovic & Rosenthal, 1988; Lasry & Lions, 2007; Weintraub et al. , 2008), that
studies complex systems under a large system limit and obtains insights about agent behavior
that are hard to obtain from analyzing finite models. The main insight behind this literature,
that in the large system limit agents’ behavior is characterized by their private state and an
aggregate distribution of the rest of system, has been used to study settings including industry
dynamics and oligopoly models (Hopenhayn, 1992; Weintraub et al. , 2008, 2011), repeated
dynamics auctions (Balseiro et al. , 2015; Iyer et al. , 2014), online labor markets (Arnosti et al.
, 2014), queueing (Manjrekar et al. , 2014; Xu & Hajek, 2013), content sharing (Li et al. , 2017),
and pedestrian motion (Lachapelle & Wolfram, 2011), among others. In these papers, the unit of
analysis is a single agent’s decision problem, assuming the behavior of all other agents together
constitutes a mean field distribution. In contrast, in our work, the unit of analysis is the game
among the agents at a single location, assuming that the behavior of agents and the resource
level at all other locations constitutes a mean field distribution.
Our work also contributes to the literature on spatial models of ride-sharing and crowd-
sourced transportation (Banerjee et al. , 2016, 2015; Braverman et al. , 2016). In this literature,
the paper most closely related to ours is (Bimpikis et al. , 2016), who consider a ride-sharing
platform with a continuum of riders and drivers spread across a finite network of locations, and
study how the platform should set origin-based prices to maximize profits. In particular, the
drivers’ decision of where, when, and whether to provide service is explicitly modeled. The paper
studies the impact of the underlying network structure of the locations on the platform’s profits
and consumers’ surplus, under the assumption that the demand at each location is stationary.
In contrast, in our model, the resources at each location (analogous to demand) are stochastic
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and time varying. However, in our model, agents decide whether to stay or switch from their
current location, and not which location to switch to.
Our model is also related to congestion games (Nisan et al. , 2007; Rosenthal, 1973), in
which agents choose paths on which to travel, and then incur costs that depend on the number
of other agents that have chosen the same path. One may view paths as being synonymous
with locations in our model, and observe that in both cases the utility/cost derived from a
path/location depends on the number of other agents using that path, or portion thereof. The
main difference between our model and congestion games is the stochastic time-varying nature
of our overall level of resource (making our model more complex), and the lack of interaction
between locations contrasting with the interaction between paths (making our model simpler).
Another related strand of literature studies ecological models of metapopulations in static
and dynamic habitats (Durrett & Levin, 1994a,b; Levin, 1970; Molofsky, 1994). Keymer et al.
(2000) consider a set of habitats, arranged on a lattice, each containing a subpopulation of a
species, and where the landscape structure of each habitat is stochastic and dynamic. Using a
mean-field analysis, and through numerical simulations, the authors study the dependence of
persistence and extinction rates of the species across habitats as a function of the rate of change
of the landscape. In such models, the species dynamics are exogenously specified, whereas we
are interested in the equilibrium behavior of agents.
Our work can be seen as an extension of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem (Chakrabarti
et al. , 2009), a generalization of the El Farol bar problem (Arthur, 1994; Chakrabarti, 2007).
In this game, each agent chooses (simultaneously) a restaurant to visit, and earns a reward that
depends both on the restaurant’s fixed rank, which is common across agents, and the number of
other agents at that restaurant. This reward is inversely proportional to the number of agents
visiting the restaurant. The Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem is studied both in the one-shot
and repeated settings, with results on the limiting behavior of myopic (Chakrabarti et al. ,
2009) and other strategies (Ghosh et al. , 2010), although we are not aware of existing results
on mean-field equilibria in this model. The model we consider is both more general, in that
we allow general reward functions and allow a location’s resource to vary stochastically, and
more specific, in that our locations are homogeneous. Our model also differs in that our agents’
decisions are made asynchronously.
2 Model
Our formal model is motivated by considering a system of locations occupied by strategic agents.
Each location has a resource level that varies over time according to a finite-state continuous-
time Markov chain, and is occupied by a time-varying collection of agents. Each agent has
an associated sequence of independent decision epochs separated by exponential times. At the
start of an agent’s decision epoch, she receives a payoff that depends on the number of other
agents at her current location and the resource level there. She then decides whether to stay at
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her location or to leave and move to another location. When moving, her destination is chosen
uniformly at random from the set of all locations other than her origin. Each agent seeks to
maximize her expected payoff over an independent exponentially distributed lifetime. When an
agent’s lifetime expires, she exits the system and is replaced by a new agent who arrives to a
new location chosen uniformly at random. In Appendix A, we provide a detailed description of
this system with finite number of agents and locations.
Since the payoff obtained by an agent at any location is determined by the number of agents
at that location, each agent’s decision to stay in her current location or to move to a new one
depends on all the other agents’ behavior. Consequently, the interaction among the agents in
this finite model is a dynamic game, and describing the agents’ behavior requires an equilibrium
analysis. Since the agents are not fully informed about the resource levels at other locations,
the standard equilibrium concept to analyze the induced dynamic game is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE). A PBE consists of a strategy ξi and a belief system µi for each player i. A
belief system µi for agent i specifies a belief µi(hit) after any history h
i
t over all aspects of the
system that she is uncertain of and that influence her expected payoff. A PBE then requires two
conditions to hold: (1) each agent i’s strategy ξi is a best response after any history hit, given
their belief system and given all other agents’ strategies; and (2) each agent i’s beliefs µi(hit) are
updated via Bayes’ rule whenever possible (see (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991b,a) for more details).
A PBE supposes a complex model of agent behavior. Each agent keeps track of her entire
history, and maintains complex beliefs about the rest of the system. While this behavioral
model may be plausible in small settings, in large systems an agent’s history may not contain
too much information about the state of all other locations, since the agent would typically only
visit a small fraction of the locations. In such settings, it is more plausible that each agent
would base her decision to stay or switch solely on the current state of the location she is in
— specifically on its level of resource and congestion — and on the aggregate features of the
entire system. Moreover, we expect that an agent would prefer to stay at a location with a high
resource level and few other agents. Below, we seek to uncover this intuitive behavioral model
as an equilibrium in large systems by letting the number of agents and the number of location
both increase proportionally to infinity, and studying the limiting infinite system.
As the number of locations and agents grows to infinity proportionally (with the proportion-
ality constant β > 0 defined as the agent density), it is reasonable to suppose that the dynamics
at any fixed finite collection of location is independent asymptotically, and that the rewards ex-
perienced by an agent can be described by modeling the dynamics at a single location and then
supposing that upon leaving that location the agent moves to another location whose dynamics
are independent and identically distributed, ad infinitum until her lifetime expires. Thus, to
analyze a large finite system, we posit a formal model for the dynamic of a single location, and
treat each agent who leaves this location as returning to an independent copy.
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2.1 Formal Model of a Single Location in the Limiting Infinite System
Here we state our formal model of a single location k. Let Zkt denote the resource level at
the location at time t ≥ 0. We assume the resource process {Zkt : t ≥ 0} is a finite state
continuous time Markov chain. We let Z denote the set of values the resource process can take.
Furthermore, we let µzy > 0 denote the transition rate of Z
k
t from a state z ∈ Z to a state y ∈ Z.
We assume that the process Zkt is irreducible and positive recurrent, with a unique invariant
distribution {pires(z) : z ∈ Z}.
We let Nkt denote the number of agents at the location k at time t. The stochastic process
(Zkt , N
k
t ) will evolve according to arrivals to this location, and the decisions made by agents at
this location. Toward that end, we suppose that new agents arrive to this location according
to a Poisson process with rate κ, and we describe the agents’ decision process below. The rate
κ models both arrivals of agents switching from other locations in a finite system, and new
arrivals of agents to the system following the exit of other agents from the system, but here it is
taken to be an input to the formal model of a single location, and below it is required to satisfy
consistency conditions in equilibrium.
Associated with each agent i at location k is a Poisson clock with rate λ, such that each
time the clock rings, the agent decides whether to stay in the location or leave. We refer to each
clock ring of agent i as her decision epoch, and let τ `i denote the time of her `
th decision epoch.
At each decision epoch τ `i , the agent i receives a payoff F (Z
k
t , N
k
t )|t=τ`i that depends on the
resource level Zkt and the number of agents N
k
t . We refer to the function F as the resource-
sharing function. We assume that the resource-sharing function is non-negative, i.e., F (z, n) ≥ 0
for each z ∈ Z and n ≥ 1. To avoid trivialities, we require that there exists a (z0, n0) such
that F (z0, n0) > 0. Finally, to model the competitive nature of interaction among the agents,
we assume that as the number of agents at a location increases, the payoff an agent receives
approaches zero: limn→∞ F (z, n) = 0 for each z ∈ Z.
To model agents with finite lifetimes, we assume that subsequent to receiving a payoff at time
τ `i , with probability 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1), the agent’s lifetime expires and the agent exits the system
permanently. Thus, each agent i can exist in the system for at most a random time interval
distributed exponentially with rate λ(1− γ). We refer to γ ∈ (0, 1) as the survival probability.
If the agent’s lifetime does not expire, then the agent i decides whether to stay at her location
or move. Agents are free to make this choice based on their history of past observations. If
the agent stays, then the dynamics and payoffs described above continue forward for another
decision epoch. If the agent leaves, then the agent is awarded a one-time payoff of Vsw > 0
and no subsequent payoffs. Here, Vsw is taken simply to be a constant input to our model for
a single location, and below it is required to satisfy a condition at equilibrium. This condition
corresponds to Vsw being the conditional expected payoff experienced by an agent when moving
to a new location whose current number of agents and resource level is distributed according to
the stationary distribution induced by equilibrium agent behavior.
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2.2 The Single-Location Decision Problem When Other Agents Follow Marko-
vian Strategies
Having specified the arrival process and agents’ decision process in a single location, we are
interested in characterizing a symmetric equilibrium among agents. For a given arrival rate κ
and the switching payoff Vsw, the particular notion of equilibrium we consider is a Markov perfect
equilibrium Fudenberg & Tirole (1991a), where in equilibrium, each agent finds it optimal to
base her decision only on the current state of the location at her decision epoch, and not on
her past (although she is not restricted from doing so). Formally, let S = Z × N0 denote the
set of possible states of the process (Zkt , N
k
t ). A Markovian strategy for an agent is a function
ξ : S → [0, 1], where ξ(z, n) denotes the probability with which the agent chooses to stay if the
state of the location at her decision epoch is (z, n) ∈ S. (Note that ξ(z, 0) is not well-defined;
by convention, we let ξ(z, 0) = 1 for all z ∈ Z).
As a step towards formulating the game among the agents, we first study the dynamics at
a location when all agents in location k adopt a Markovian strategy ξ. Given the arrival rate κ
and the Markovian strategy ξ, the process (Zkt , N
k
t ) for any location k evolves as a continuous
time Markov chain on the state space S with the following transition rate matrix Qξ,κ:
Qξ,κ ((z, n)→ (x,m)) = I{x 6= z,m = n}µz,x + I{x = z,m = n+ 1}κ
+ I{x = z,m = n− 1}λn (1− γξ(z, n))
− I{x = z,m = n}
∑
y 6=z
µz,y + κ+ λn (1− γξ(z, n))
 , (1)
where z, x ∈ Z and n,m ∈ N0. Here, the first term on the right-hand side represents the
transition in the resource level Zkt at the location, which is an independent Markov chain with
rates µz,x. The second term on the right-hand side represents the arrival of an agent to the
location k at rate κ. The third term on the right-hand side represents the departure of one of
the n agents from the location k. Such a departure can only occur at a decision epoch of one
of these agents. At any such decision epoch, an agent stays with probability ξ(z, n) times the
survival probability γ. Thus, with probability 1−γξ(z, n), the agent leaves the location k. Since
there are n agents at the location, each of whose decision epoch occur at rate λ, the total rate
for a departure at the location is given by λn(1− γξ(z, n)). Finally, the last term on the right-
hand side represents the rate of no transition. We denote this continuous time Markov chain
describing the dynamics of a single location, where all agents adopt the Markovian strategy ξ
and the rate of arrival of agents is κ, by MC(ξ, κ).
Now, consider the decision problem faced by a single agent i at location k, assuming all other
agents (current as well as in future) at the location follow strategy ξ. For any fixed switching
payoff Vsw > 0, and arrival rate κ, the decision problem faced by an agent i can be described as
follows. As long as the agent stays at location k, at each decision epoch τ `i , she receives a payoff
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F (Z`i , N
`
i ), and must choose whether to “stay” in location k or to “switch”. Also, irrespective
of this decision, the agent’s lifetime expires with probability 1 − γ. On choosing to stay, with
survival probability γ, the agent continues until her next decision epoch τ `+1i . On choosing to
switch, with survival probability γ, the agent immediately receives the switching payoff Vsw.
From this description, it follows that the decision problem facing an agent i in location k is
an optimal stopping problem. Denote this optimal stopping problem by DEC(ξ, κ, Vsw). In the
following, we develop the dynamic programming formulation of this problem.
We begin by defining the value functions for the agent. Let V (z, n) denote the value function
of agent i at her decision epoch, prior to her making a decision or receiving payoffs, given resource
level z ∈ Z and the number of agents n ∈ N at location k. Similarly, we let Vst(z, n) denote the
continuation payoff of the agent at her decision epoch, subsequent to her making the decision
to stay and conditional on her not leaving the system, given resource level z and the number
of agents n at location k. We have the following Bellman’s equation for the optimal stopping
problem DEC(ξ, κ, Vsw) faced by the agent:
V (z, n) = F (z, n) + γmax{Vst(z, n), Vsw}
Vst(z, n) = E
ξ[V (Zτ , Nτ )|z, n],
(2)
where Eξ[·|z, n] denotes the expectation with respect to the process defined by (1), subject to
(Z0, N0) = (z, n), and τ denotes the time of the first decision epoch of the agent i. Here, the
first equation follows from the fact that at the decision epoch, the agent receives an immediate
payoff equal to F (z, n), and has to make the decision whether to stay or switch. Subsequent
to the decision, the agent survives in the system with probability γ. Upon choosing to switch
and surviving, the agent receives a continuation payoff equal to Vsw. On the other hand, upon
choosing to stay and surviving, the agent receives a continuation payoff equal to Vst(z, n). The
second equation relates Vst(z, n) to the expectation of the agent’s value function at the next
decision epoch.
For value functions V and Vst satisfying the Bellman’s equation (2), any optimal strategy
ξi for agent i chooses to stay if the resource level z and the number of agents n in the location
satisfies Vst(z, n) > Vsw, to switch if Vst(z, n) < Vsw, and any mixed action if Vst(z, n) = Vsw.
We let OPT(ξ, κ, Vsw) denote the set of all optimal strategies for the agent’s decision specified
by (2). Specifically, for any Markovian strategy ξˆ, we have ξˆ ∈ OPT(ξ, κ, Vsw) if and only if
the following conditions hold: ξˆ(z, n) = 1 if Vst(z, n) > Vsw; ξˆ(z, n) = 0 if Vst(z, n) < Vsw; and
ξˆ(z, n) ∈ (0, 1) only if Vst(z, n) = Vsw.
2.3 Mean field equilibrium
With the description of the model in place, we are now ready to formally define the notion of
equilibrium we focus on.
First, for any arrival rate κ and the switching payoff Vsw, we require the agents play a Markov
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perfect equilibrium at the location k. In other words, we require the strategy ξ to satisfy the
following requirement: assuming all agents other than an agent i follow the strategy ξ, the
agent i maximizes her payoff (across all possibly history-dependent strategies) by following the
strategy ξ. This leads us to the following condition:
ξ ∈ OPT(ξ, κ, Vsw). (3)
Now, suppose for a given κ and Vsw, a Markov perfect equilibrium ξ is being played at
location k. Then, the dynamics of the location’s state are given by MC(ξ, κ). Let pi(ξ, κ) denote
the steady state distribution of this process. In particular, for z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0, we let piz,n(ξ, κ)
denote the probability that the location has a resource level z and the number of agents n in
steady state. (We drop the explicit dependence of the steady state distribution on ξ and κ,
when the context is clear.) Thus, pi(ξ, κ) is an invariant distribution under Qξ,κ, and satisfies∑
z∈Z
∑
n∈N0
piz,n(ξ, κ)Q
ξ,κ((z, n)→ (x,m)) = 0, for all x ∈ Z,m ∈ N0. (4)
Now, consider an agent arriving to the location k in steady state pi(ξ, κ). We denote the total
expected payoff that this agent receives over her lifetime on following the strategy ξ by Varr.
Using the definition of the value function Vst, we obtain
Varr =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,n(ξ, κ)Vst(z, n+ 1).
Here, the right hand side is obtained by observing that after the agent arrives to the location
in state (z, n), which happens with probability piz,n(ξ, κ), the number of agents at that location
becomes n+ 1, and the agent’s continuation payoff is then Vst(z, n+ 1).
Our second condition on equilibrium requires that the total expected payoff Varr to an agent
arriving at location k equals the total expected payoff an agent at the location receives upon
switching Vsw. Intuitively, we expect this condition to hold in any symmetric equilibrium of a
system with a large but finite number of homogeneous locations, where agents choose whether
to stay in their current location or switch to a different location (chosen uniformly at random).
In such a model, the switching decisions of the agents will force the switching payoffs of all
populated locations to have the same value. Since our model of a single location does not
endogenously capture these considerations, we impose this explicitly. In particular, we require
that the switching payoff satisfies the following equation:
Vsw =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,n(ξ, κ)Vst(z, n+ 1). (5)
The final condition we impose on the equilibrium is a requirement on the arrival rate κ.
Again, intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium of a large finite model with homogeneous locations,
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we expect the expected number of agents at each location to be the same, given by the agent
density β > 0. To capture this in our model, we require that for a given agent density β, the
arrival rate κ satisfies the following condition:∑
(z,n)∈S
npiz,n(ξ, κ) = β. (6)
Given these three conditions, we are now ready to define a mean-field equilibrium:
Definition 1 (Mean field equilibrium). A mean field equilibrium (MFE) consists of a strategy
ξ, an arrival rate κ and a switching payoff Vsw satisfying (3), (5), and (6).
Note that, in comparison to a PBE, a mean field equilibrium adopts a fairly natural and a
vastly simpler model of agent behavior. In a PBE of a finite model, an agent’s strategy depends
on the state of her current location, her history, as well as her belief about the state of all other
locations. Moreover, the agent constantly updates this belief based on her observations of the
arrival process at her current location. For example, if an agent sees a high volume of arrivals at
her current location, her updated belief would attribute lower resource levels at other locations,
thereby lowering her expected payoff for switching. Such complex considerations do not arise
in an MFE, where the payoff from switching is assumed to be fixed and independent of the
state dynamics of the current location. In a large market, this assumption is reasonable, as the
fluctuations in the empirical distribution of the states of other locations are expected to cancel
each other, analogous to a law of large numbers result1.
In the next section, we show existence of a mean field equilibrium.
3 Existence of a mean field equilibrium
Below, we state the main result of the paper, proving the existence of an MFE for general
resource-sharing functions. Subsequently, in Section 4, we analyze the structure and properties
of a mean field equilibrium under specific assumptions on the resource-sharing function. We
have the following main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For any λ > 0, β > 0 and {µz,y > 0 : z, y ∈ Z}, there exists a mean field
equilibrium (ξ, κ, Vsw), where ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all large enough n.
The underlying argument behind the proof is to carefully construct a correspondence R and
show that the existence of a mean field equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a fixed
point of R. The latter is obtained by an application of Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem
(Aliprantis & Border, 2006). Here, we first sketch the steps involved, and highlight the technical
challenges in each of those steps. Using these intermediate results, we then provide the proof of
Theorem 3.1. (The complete proof is provided in Appendices B-G.)
1Proving this statement rigorously is an interesting direction for future work.
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1. We first show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, the Markov chain
MC(ξ, κ) has a unique invariant distribution pi satisfying (4). This involves showing that
the chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive recurrent, which we accomplish by using
coupling arguments to bound the chain between two M/M/∞ queues. The proof of
this result is provided in Appendix B.
Denote the (unique) invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) by pi(ξ, κ). In Appendix C, by ap-
plying Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1963), we show that the invariant distribution
pi(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ).
2. Second, we establish that for any strategy ξ, there exists a unique value of κ > 0,
such that the invariant distribution pi(ξ, κ) satisfies (6). This result is achieved by
showing that the quantity
∑
(z,n)∈S npi(z, n), where pi = pi(ξ, κ) is strictly increasing and
continuous for κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] for any fixed ξ, and using the intermediate value
theorem. The proof of this result is provided in Appendix D.
Let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of the arrival rate κ for which pi(ξ, κ) satisfies (6). The
first two steps together then define an injective map from the strategy ξ to an arrival
rate κ(ξ) and a steady state distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)), such that pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the (unique)
invariant distribution of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and satisfies (6).
3. Third, we consider the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw) for a given strategy ξ and
switching payoff Vsw. We let V(ξ, Vsw) denote the value function satisfying the corre-
sponding Bellman equation (2), and let Vst(ξ, Vsw) denote the corresponding continua-
tion payoff function. Finally, we let Vsw(ξ, Vsw) denote the right-hand-side of (5):
Vsw(ξ, Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,nVst(z, n+ 1),
where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)), and Vst = Vst(ξ, Vsw).
In Appendix E, we show that these functions are uniformly bounded. In particular, we
show that there exists 0 < V ≤ V, such that for all Markovian strategy ξ and Vsw > 0,
we have the switching payoff Vsw(ξ, Vsw) ∈ [V,V]. The proof of the uniform bounds
makes extensive use of the strong Markov property for the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)).
4. Fourth, we let X (ξ, Vsw) denote the set of all optimal strategies for the agent’s decision
problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw). Note that X (ξ, Vsw) = OPT(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw). In Appendix F,
we identify a convex, compact set Π̂ of Markovian strategies, such that if ξ ∈ Π̂, and
Vsw ∈ [V,V], then X (ξ, Vsw) ⊆ Π̂. Let Υ = Π̂× [V,V].
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ξ κ(ξ) pi(ξ, κ(ξ))
Vsw Vst(ξ, Vsw) Vsw(ξ, Vsw)
X (ξ, Vsw)
Figure 1: Illustration of the correspondence R(ξ, Vsw) = X (ξ, Vsw)× {Vsw(ξ, Vsw)}. (Here single
arrows denote functions, and double arrows denote correspondences.)
5. Finally, we construct the correspondence R : Υ⇒ Υ defined as
R(ξ, Vsw) = X (ξ, Vsw)× {Vsw(ξ, Vsw)}
= {(ζ,Vsw(ξ, Vsw)) : ζ ∈ X (ξ, Vsw)} .
We depict the map pictorially in Fig. 1. In Appendix G, we show that the corre-
spondence R is upper-hemicontinuous. This requires showing the continuity of the
value functions in (ξ, Vsw), which is achieved using the continuity in ξ of the process
MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) under the topology of weak-convergence (Ethier & Kurtz, 1986).
We then obtain the following proof for the existence of a mean field equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The steps outlined above show that R is an upper-hemicontinuous cor-
respondence on a convex, compact subset Υ of a metric space, with values that are non-empty
and convex. From an application of the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem (Aliprantis &
Border, 2006), we obtain that R has a fixed point, i.e., there exists (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ such that
(ξ, Vsw) ∈ R(ξ, Vsw).
Thus, by definition of R, we have ξ ∈ X (ξ, Vsw). This implies that ξ satisfies (3) for the
decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw). Second, by definition of κ(ξ), we obtain that the steady
state distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies (6). Finally, from Vsw = Vsw(ξ, Vsw), we obtain that (5)
holds. From this, we conclude that (ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw) constitutes a mean-field equilibrium.
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4 Equilibrium Analysis for Decreasing Resource-Sharing Func-
tions
Having shown the existence of an MFE for general resource-sharing functions, we now char-
acterize the equilibrium strategy for the specific case, where the resource-sharing function is
non-increasing in the number of agents at the location. Under this assumption, we show exis-
tence of an MFE in which the equilibrium strategies have a threshold structure. We then use
this structural characterization in Section 5 to compute this MFE and analyze its welfare.
We define decreasing resource-sharing functions as follows:
Definition 2. We say that a resource-sharing function F is decreasing if F (z, n+ 1) ≤ F (z, n)
for each z ∈ Z and all n ∈ N.
Decreasing resource-sharing functions appear when agents’ interactions are competitive rather
than cooperative. In section 5 we consider these three examples of decreasing resource-sharing
functions.
• As a first example of a decreasing resource-sharing function, consider F (z, n) = f(z)/n
for some function f . This models settings where all agents at a location equally share
the resource there. In particular, given resource level z at a location, the n agents at the
location would collectively obtain total payoffs at rate λnF (z, n) = λf(z), a quantity
independent of n. We refer to the quantity W (z, n) , λnF (z, n) as single-location
welfare function.
• Next, consider F (z, n) = f(z)/√n. Here, the agents collectively receive payoffs at rate
λ
√
nf(z), which is increasing in n. While agents compete with each other, the single-
location welfare function increases with the number of agents there.
• Finally, consider F (z, n) = f(z)/n3/2. This models extremely competitive settings,
where the single-location welfare function decreases with the number of agents.
Before providing our result, we define threshold strategies. Formally, for x = (xz : z ∈ Z),
where xz ∈ R+ for each z ∈ Z, define the threshold strategy ξx as follows:
ξx(z, n) =

1 if n < bxzc;
xz − bxzc if n = bxzc;
0 otherwise.
for each z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0. In particular, under strategy ξx, an agent, at her decision epoch,
will stay at her current location with resource level z ∈ Z if the number of agents n at the
location is strictly below bxzc; will switch to a different location if n > bxzc; and will stay with
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probability xz−bxzc and switch with remaining probability if n = bxzc. We say that a strategy
is a threshold strategy if it is of this form.
We now state our main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. If F is a decreasing resource-sharing function, there exists an MFE (ξ, κ, Vsw)
where ξ is a threshold strategy.
The proof of the theorem makes essential use of the following lemma, which states that with
decreasing resource-sharing functions, the continuation values are non-increasing.
Lemma 4.1. Let ξ be a Markovian strategy, κ > 0 and Vsw > 0. If F is a decreasing resource-
sharing function, then for each z ∈ Z, the continuation payoff Vst(z, n) for the decision problem
DEC(ξ, κ, Vsw) is non-increasing in n.
The proof of the lemma, provided in Appendix H, shows that the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ, Vsw)
has a dynamic program that satisfies closed convex cone properties defined in (Smith & McCar-
dle, 2002). With the lemma in place, the proof of Theorem 4.1 follows from minor modifications
of the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1, and is omitted.
5 Computation of MFE and Numerical Equilibrium Analysis
The implications of Theorem 4.1 are of substantial practical importance: when the resource-
sharing function is decreasing, the equilibrium behavior of the agents can be fully described
by |Z| non-negative real numbers {xz : z ∈ Z}. This parsimony allows simple computational
methods to numerically identify an equilibrium, especially when |Z| is small. We use this fact
to analyze the equilibrium numerically for several representative decreasing resource-sharing
functions. We first describe our approach for computing an equilibrium in more detail below.
5.1 Computation of MFE
To simplify notation in this section, we use x to denote the threshold strategy ξx. Recall that
an MFE is a fixed point of the correspondence R(x, Vsw) = X (x, Vsw) × Vsw(x, Vsw). For any
(x, Vsw), we define the distance metric distR as follows:
distR(x, Vsw) = |Vsw − Vsw(x, Vsw)|+ inf
y∈X (x,Vsw)
‖x− y‖2,
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm. The second term on the right-hand side denotes the
distance between x and the set X (x, Vsw), which is compact and convex. To find a fixed point
of R, we identify a value of (x, Vsw) such that distR(x, Vsw) = 0. We implement two relaxations
to this exact problem. First, we consider an approximation distR to the metric distR, obtained
primarily by truncating the state space to a finite set. Second, we perform an adaptive search
method to find a (approximate) minimizer of the function distR. We choose this approximate
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minimizer as the value of the (approximate) MFE strategy and the corresponding switching
payoff. We describe the steps in detail below.
1. We truncate the state space S of the agent’s decision problem to SL = Z×{0, 1, · · · , L−1}
for some L ∈ N. For each x ∈ [0, L − 1]|Z|, we let MCL(x, κ) denote the Markov chain
obtained by restricting the transitions of the chain MC(x, κ) to lie in the set SL, and
let piL(x, κ) denote its steady state distribution. For any x ∈ [0, L]|Z|, the distribution
piL(x, κ) can be obtained by solving a set of L · |Z| linear equations analogous to (4).
2. For any given x ∈ [0, L−1]|Z|, we perform a binary search over the interval [βλ(1−γ), βλ]
to find a value κ = κL(x) for which∣∣∣∣∣∑
z∈Z
L∑
n=0
npiz,n − β
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,
where pi = piL(x, κL(x)) and 1 > 0 denotes the tolerance level within which we seek to
satisfy (6).
3. For any given x ∈ [0, L− 1]|Z| and Vsw ∈ [V,V], we then consider the decision problem
DEC(x, κL(x), Vsw) (with state space restricted to SL). We perform value iteration to
compute approximate value functions Vst(x, Vsw) and Vsw(x, Vsw), where we iterate until
Vst(x, Vsw) is within 0 > 0 (in sup-norm) of the limit. Using these approximate value
functions, we identify the set of approximately optimal thresholds X (x, Vsw). Define
distR by replacing Vsw and X in the definition of distR with Vsw and X .
4. We seek to minimize distR(x, Vsw) over all values of x ∈ [0, L−1]|Z| and Vsw ∈ [V,V]. We
use the Nelder-Mead neighborhood search method (Nelder & Mead, 1965) to find the
minimizer of the distance function. To locate the global minimum, we run the method
in parallel with multiple initial values of x and Vsw, chosen among a discretized set of
threshold strategies ΠkL = {0, (L− 1)/k, 2(L− 1)/k, · · · , (k − 1)(L− 1)/k, L− 1}|Z| for
some k ∈ N and a discretized subset of [V,V] constructed in a similar way.
5. After obtaining (x∗, V ∗sw) that attains the minimum of dist

R over all runs, we do a val-
idation check by comparing distR(x∗, V ∗sw) with a threshold 2 to see if this distance is
close enough to 0 for (x∗, V ∗sw) to be an equilibrium. We accept (x∗, V ∗sw) as an approxi-
mate MFE strategy and the corresponding switching payoff if distR(x∗, V ∗sw) ≤ 2. If the
validation check fails, a larger k is chosen to provide more fine-grained initial starting
points until a maximum number of iterations is reached. Although our method does not
guarantee to find an approximate equilibrium on terminating, in all our computations
in section 5.2, we obtain an approximate equilibrium with corresponding distR smaller
than 10−10.
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We also note that there may be multiple equilibria in our model for general model parameters
and resource-sharing functions; we have not shown uniqueness. Such instances of non-uniqueness
may arise, for example, when the resource-sharing function is multimodal, as in those settings,
coordination concerns dominate, and an agent may prefer to stay at a location if other agents do
so, and prefer to switch if others switch. In such instances, the preceding numerical procedure
selects for a particular (approximate) equilibrium, and our comparative statics results in the
following section correspond to the equilibrium2 selected by this algorithm.
5.2 Comparative statics
In this section, we present the results of our numerical investigations of the agents’ behavior in
a mean field equilibrium using the computational approach described in the preceding section.
We study the setting where Z = {0, 1}, with transitions rates µ0,1 = µ1,0 = µ. As our model is
invariant to proportional scaling of the transition rate µ and the agents’ inter-epoch rate λ, we
fix λ = 1. We set the survival probability to γ = 0.95. We consider decreasing resource-sharing
functions of the form F (z, n) = zn−α, where α ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. In this setting, some locations
have resource (those with z = 1) while others do not (z = 0), and the single-location welfare
function is increasing for α = 0.5, constant for α = 1, and decreasing for α = 1.5 in the number
of agents there. Finally, our approximation scheme uses parameters L = 200, k = 20, 0 = 10
−4,
1 = 10
−6 and 2 = 10−8.
In our computational study, we study how the model’s parameters influence both agent
behavior as quantified by the equilibrium thresholds and system efficiency as quantified by
the welfare per location. The welfare per location is defined as the rate of total expected payoff
obtained in equilibrium by all the agents at a location in steady state. At a location with resource
level z ∈ Z and n agents, the total payoff rate to those n agents is given by W (z, n) = λnF (z, n).
Since in steady state, the state (z, n) is distributed according to the mean field distribution pi,
the agents’ welfare per location equals
WL = Epi[W (Z,N)] =
∑
z,n
λnF (z, n)piz,n.
We also analyze the welfare per agent, defined as the rate at which a randomly chosen agent
receives payoff in equilibrium. Since the agent density is equal to β, the welfare per agent WA
is given by WA = WL/β. When β is held fixed the two welfare measures are proportional, and
thus we study WA in addition to WL only when we vary β.
Figure 2 shows how the equilibrium thresholds and the welfare per location vary as the
resource process changes more frequently, i.e, as µ increases, for a fixed value of β = 20. For
each resource-sharing function, for small values of µ, the difference between the thresholds x1
2We conjecture that the equilibrium is unique when the resource-sharing function is decreasing and the resource
level is binary, the setting we study for comparative statics in Section 5.2. An extensive numerical investigation
supports this conjecture, but we do not have a formal proof.
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and x0 is substantial. Since the resource level changes slowly, an agent in a location with resource
is willing to suffer significant competition (in the form of other agents) before choosing to switch
her location. Note that, as α increases, the level of competition at which agents switch decreases,
consistent with our observation that as α increases, competition becomes more severe. On the
other hand, as µ increases, the difference in the two thresholds diminishes. This is because
increasing µ diminishes the benefit of staying in a location. As the resource levels change more
frequently, the resource process mixes more readily and thus future resource levels are less
correlated with current levels.
Figure 2 also shows that the welfare per location depends crucially on the resource-sharing
function. When the single-location welfare function increases with the number of agents at
that location (α = 1/2), the welfare per location decreases as resource levels change more
frequently, i.e., as µ increases. In contrast, when the single-location welfare function decreases
with the number of agents there (α = 3/2), the welfare per location increases as µ increases.
To understand this, observe that when µ is small, the thresholds x1 and x0 are well-separated,
implying that the agents will be concentrated in locations with positive resource level. On
the other hand, when µ is large, the two thresholds are similar, and agents are more equitably
distributed between locations with and without resource. When α < 1, the former distribution of
the agents obtains more welfare per location, since single-location welfare function is increasing
with the number of agents at a location with resource, and having more agents at these locations
increases welfare. On the other hand, when α > 1, the former distribution incurs lower welfare
per location due to severe competition among the agents at the location with resource. (When
α = 1, the distribution of the agents between locations with or without resource does not
substantially affect the welfare per location. In particular, as long as a location with resource
has at least one agent present, the total payoff at that location is the same.)
Figure 3 shows equilibrium properties as a function of the agent density β when resource
levels change slowly (µ = 0.25). The difference between the thresholds x1 and x0 widens as β
increases for each resource-sharing function. This is because increasing β for any fixed state
(z, n) at the current location diminishes an agent’s expected payoff from switching, since there
are more agents to compete against. Thus, when the current location has resource, the agents
become more likely to stay as β gets larger.
We further observe that, as β increases, the welfare per location increases when α = 0.5,
decreases when α = 1.5, and is essentially constant when α = 1. As in Figure 2, this relation is
explained by the equilibrium distribution of agents between locations with and without resource,
arising from the dependence of the equilibrium thresholds on β: as the difference between the
two thresholds increases, the welfare per location increases when α = 0.5, and decreases when
α = 1.5. However, since the degree of competition increases as β increases, we observe that
irrespective of the resource-sharing function the welfare per agent decreases.
The preceding comparative statics reveals an important feature of our dynamic model and
its equilibrium that is lacking in a static analysis: our analysis captures the joint distribution
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Figure 2: Equilibrium thresholds and welfare under different resource transition rates µ, with
agent density fixed at β = 20.
of the agents and the resource levels across locations. Figure 2 demonstrates this by showing
that agents’ strategies change as the resource transition rate µ changes. In contrast, since all
values of µ result in the same steady-state proportion (50%) of locations in each resource state,
a static analysis that only tracks the stationary resource state distribution would generate the
same market outcomes for all values of µ. Furthermore, the welfare also changes with µ for
resource-sharing functions other than z/n, where the total payoff rate in a location λnF (z, n)
depends non-trivially on n. Such an effect would not materialize in a static model which ignores
the dynamics of the resource process and tracks only the steady state.
5.3 Case study: Setting platform commission
In this section, we provide a case study to illustrate how our model can be used to evaluate engi-
neering interventions. Specifically, we apply our model to the ride-hailing market in Manhattan.
Ride-hailing platforms charge a commission when they transfer rider payments to their driver
partners, and consequently, the drivers’ behavior in the market is influenced by this commis-
sion rate. In this case study, we investigate how different commission rates affect the aggregate
revenue of the drivers and the platform (and how it is split between the two); the outcome of
this analysis provides a reference for platforms when an adjustment of commission rate is under
consideration.
We view taxi drivers as agents, different neighborhoods of Manhattan as locations, and taxi
trip demand as the resource in our model. We assume the drivers, at the end of each day, decide
for the next day whether to stay in the same neighborhood or switch to another one. We also
assume a driver makes this decision based on the trip demand in his current neighborhood as
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Figure 3: Equilibrium thresholds and welfare under different agent densities β. WA is multiplied
by 15 for all values. Note the resource transition rate is given by µ = 0.25.
well as his estimate of the number of competing drivers in the same neighborhood.
Below we describe how the model parameters are estimated, and further describe the as-
sumptions. We use the yellow cab trip records from the New York City Taxi and Limousine
Commission dataset (NYC, n.d.) to estimate these parameters. The data limitations prevent
us from performing a full-blown analysis; in such instances, we use our judgment to assign
parameter values. We set the parameter values as follows:
• Agent density β: We divide Manhattan into 12 regions, with the diameter of each region
approximately equal to the average taxi trip length in Manhattan. The agent density
is then estimated as β = 400 drivers per location, following an estimate of 4800 active
taxi drivers, obtained by averaging across different times of day.
• Resource process {µz,y}: We assume a resource model with binary states, with 0 de-
noting the typical resource state, and 1 denoting a high resource state. Such a high
resource may describe local conditions (such as local events, weather patterns, etc) that
temporarily lead to high demand for rides. To estimate the transition rates between the
two states, we use weather as a proxy, and estimate the transition between rainy and
non-rainy days using historical weather data from Manhattan (Wea, n.d.). This yields
a transition rate of µ0,1 = 1/3.86 and µ1,0 = 1/1.93, with units day
−1. These values are
a reasonable proxy for state transitions, indicating a high resource state approximately
every 4 days, for a duration of about 2 consecutive days.
• Payment function F : Most ride-hailing platforms use dynamic pricing mechanisms to
improve market efficiency, and such mechanisms can be designed to increase the aggre-
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gate revenue with the number of drivers (Castillo et al. , 2017; Chen, 2016), as increased
driver availability allows more trips to happen. However, at the same time, higher com-
petition among the drivers decreases the revenue received by an individual driver. To
model these aspects, we let the aggregate revenue rate from riders at a location with
resource state z and n drivers equal n1−αf(z) for some parameter α ∈ (0, 1), where f(z)
captures the dependence on the resource state. This entails the revenue rate per driver
to equal f(z)/nα and hence the rate of payment to an individual driver in the location
takes the following form:
F (z, n) =
(1− c(z))f(z)
nα
, z ∈ {0, 1}, n ∈ N,
where c(z) denotes the (resource-dependent) commission rate charged by the platform.
For our analysis, we choose α = 0.5. To estimate f(0), we use the average daily rider
payment on non-rainy days in Manhattan from (NYC, n.d.), which yields an estimate
of 1.2×104 dollars per hour per location. We do not, however, estimate f(1) using rider
payments on rainy days, since our data comes from yellow cab data with fixed prices,
whereas modern ride-hailing platforms typically increase price as demand increases. We
therefore assume the average total rider payment when the resource is high (z = 1) to
be 20% higher, and set f(1) = 1.2f(0).
• Decision rate: We choose λ = 1 day−1.
• Survival probability: We choose γ = 0.995, indicating a planning horizon of 1/λ(1−γ) =
200 days.
Assuming a baseline commission rate of 15% in both resource states, we investigate how the
revenue of drivers and the platform would vary under a number of commission rate scenarios.
For each such combination of c(0) and c(1) (and under parameter values described above), we
numerically compute the resulting mean field equilibrium in our model, and the driver and
platform revenues in the computed equilibrium. We share these results in Table 1. These results
can be used to access the magnitude of the impact, and to decide whether commission should
be raised in aggregate, or if it would be better to selectively raise it based on demand (resource
states). A table such as this could be shared with decision makers as part of a larger decision
process.
As discussed earlier, our dynamic model allows us to capture the joint distribution of the
drivers and the aggregate revenue across locations. The distribution of the drivers across loca-
tions is important because it influences a driver’s payoff upon switching, which influences her
switching decisions. Our model enables us to include this endogenous effect of the driver dis-
tribution on the drivers’ switching decisions in evaluating different commission rates. Without
the dynamics (and the tractable equilibrium concept of a mean field equilibrium), such effects
would be hard to incorporate in a static analysis, rendering it incomplete.
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c(0) c(1) DriRev ∆DriRev PlatRev ∆PlatRev AggRev ∆AggRev
0.15 0.15 26.121 - 4.610 - 30.731 -
0.175 0.175 25.353 -2.94% 5.378 16.66% 30.731 0.00%
0.15 0.20 25.504 -2.36% 5.219 13.20% 30.723 -0.02%
0.20 0.15 25.210 -3.49% 5.507 19.46% 30.718 -0.04%
0.2 0.2 24.584 -5.88% 6.146 33.32% 30.730 0.00%
Table 1: Here, c(z) is the commission rate at resource state z ∈ {0, 1}. DriRev, PlatRev and
AggRev denote the revenue (in units 105 dollars per hour) for drivers, for the platform, and in
aggregate, respectively. ∆DriRev denotes the change in drivers’ revenue compared with the base
case (c(0) = c(1) = 0.15), with ∆PlatRev and ∆AggRev defined similarly.
6 Conclusion
Our results establish that in equilibrium, the agents in our model base their decision to explore
solely on the state of the location they currently reside in, and on its steady state distribution.
In particular, our results justify analyzing spatio-temporal models under simple yet optimal
models of agent behavior.
Our model and analysis raise many topics for future research. First, we have used the notion
of a mean field equilibrium to analyze a single location in isolation, assuming the other locations
are described by the mean field distribution. A natural question is whether the resulting strategy
constitutes an approximate equilibrium in the system with large but finite number of agents and
locations. Such approximation results for mean field equilibrium have been obtained in other
contexts (see, for example, (Adlakha et al. , 2015; Balseiro et al. , 2015; Iyer et al. , 2014)). In
the finite system, a single agent visits multiple locations over her lifetime, inducing correlations
among the states of those locations. The analytical challenge in obtaining an approximation
result involves showing that as the system size increases, such correlations vanish, and in the
limit, the dynamics of a location in the finite system approaches the dynamics of the single-
location in our model.
On the modeling front, we have assumed that each location is homogeneous. In particular,
we assume the resource process is distributed independently and identically across different lo-
cations. One consequence of this homogeneity is agents do not choose their destination when
they switch. It is straightforward to extend our model and the analysis to incorporate location
heterogeneity and to let agents choose their destination when switching. Such a model would
better represent the settings we study. For example, in ride-hailing settings, residential neigh-
borhoods have different demand characteristics than business districts, and drivers choose the
neighborhood to operate in based on these characteristics. A formal finite model of this exten-
sion has multiple types of locations, where each location has type-dependent resource dynamics,
resource-sharing function and agent density. Agents choose not only whether to stay or switch,
but also which location type to switch to, whereupon the destination is chosen uniformly among
locations of that type. Using similar arguments for the homogeneous setting, we can obtain the
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corresponding limiting infinite system meant to capture the limiting behavior as the number of
agents and the locations increases with the type distribution and the agent density fixed. Our
proof of existence of a mean field equilibrium applies in this setting with minor modifications;
we omit the details due to space considerations. On the other hand, we have assumed that the
resource process at a location is exogenous specified, whereas an extension could allow for the
resource transitions at a location to depend on the number of agents therein.
Finally, our work also sets the stage for analyzing engineering interventions and their eco-
nomic impact. One such intervention involves altering the resource sharing function at each
location through subsidies or penalties to induce the agents to stay in or switch from a location,
thereby affecting their welfare. A further question is whether sharing information about loca-
tions’ states would benefit or harm the agents, and how such an information sharing mechanism
should be designed. Answers to these questions would help platforms such as Uber or Airbnb
to increase their efficiency.
A Description of the finite system
In this section, we provide a formal description of the system with finite number of locations
and agents (the “finite system”), which motivates our mean field model.
The finite system has a set of locations K, where each location k ∈ K contains a stochastic
time-varying resource. We use Zkt to denote the resource level at location k at time t ≥ 0. We
assume the resource process {Zkt : t ≥ 0} is a finite state continuous time Markov chain, and
further assume the resource processes across different locations in the system are distributed
identically and independently. We let Z denote the set of values the resource process can take,
and let µzy > 0 denote the transition rate of Z
k
t from a state z ∈ Z to a state y ∈ Z. Furthermore,
we make the assumption that each process Zkt is irreducible and positive recurrent, with a unique
invariant distribution given by {pires(z) : z ∈ Z}.
Spread across this set of locations are N agents. Each agent may switch between locations
in search for resources and less competition, as we detail below. Each agent i is associated with
a Poisson clock with rate λ, such that each time the clock rings, the agent decides whether to
stay in the location or switch to another one. We refer to each clock ring of agent i as the
agent’s decision epoch, and let τ `i and k
`
i denote the time and location of her `
th decision epoch
respectively.
We let Nkt denote the number of agents at the location k at time t. At each decision epoch
t = τ `i , the agent i at location k = k
`
i receives a payoff F (Z
k
t , N
k
t ) that depends on the resource
level Zkt and the number of agents N
k
t at that location. We make the same assumptions on F
as in Section 2.1.
Subsequent to receiving the payoff, the agent i makes the decision whether to continue
staying at her location or move to a different location. On choosing to move to a different
location, agent i instantaneously arrives at a new location k`+1i . We make the assumption that
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the new location k`+1i is drawn independently and uniformly from the set of all locations other
than the agent’s current location. Note that this assumption precludes us from modeling an
agent’s strategic choice of which location to move to. Nevertheless, we make this assumption as,
even under this restrictive assumption, the analysis of the agent’s decision problem turns out to
be challenging. In Section 6, we discussed a few extensions and modifications that align closer
to practical settings.
Similar to the mean field model, we assume agents in the finite system are short-lived: after
each decision epoch τ `i , subsequent to making her decision regarding whether to stay in her
current location or move to a different location, the agent i departs the system independently
with probability 1− γ, never to return, and we denote as τi the time she leaves the system. We
also assume for each agent that departs, a new agent arrives to the system at a location chosen
uniformly at random, to maintain constant system size, same as in the mean field model.
Finally, we describe the utility and the information structure of each agent in the model. We
assume that each agent i, at each time t, at her current location k, observes the resource level
Zkt and the number of agents N
k
t . On the other hand, the agent cannot observe the resource
level and the number of agents at any other location. We assume the agents have perfect recall,
and hence, at any decision epoch τ `i , agent i bases her decision to stay or move on the entire
history (namely the resource levels and the number of agents at each location she has visited)
she has observed until that time.
Given this informational assumption, each agent i is risk-neutral and wants to maximize the
total expected payoff accrued over her lifetime. Formally, each agent i seeks to maximize
E
[ ∞∑
`=1
F (Z`i , N
`
i )I{τ `i ≤ τi}
]
,
where the expectation is over the randomness in the resource levels, the arrival and departure
process of the agents, and their (and their competitors’) strategies. Since the departure of an
agent is independent of the rest of the system, it is straightforward to show that the agent’s
expected payoff can be equivalently written as
E
[ ∞∑
`=1
γ`−1F (Z`i , N
`
i )
]
.
Thus, each agent i’s decision problem is equivalent to the decision problem faced by a persistent
agent (who never departs the system) seeking to maximizer her total expected discounted payoff.
B Existence and uniqueness of invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ)
In this section, we show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, the Markov
chain MC(ξ, κ) has a unique steady state distribution.
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Lemma B.1. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ ≥ 0, there exists a unique steady
state distribution for MC(ξ, κ) satisfying (4).
Proof. Fix a Markovian strategy ξ, and an arrival rate κ > 0. We prove the lemma statement
by showing that the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive recurrent. The fact that
MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible follows straightforwardly from (1) and the fact that the resource process
is independent and ergodic. Thus, it only remains to show that the chain is positive recurrent.
Let S0 , {(z, 0) : z ∈ Z} and define Tz(S0) is the first return time of the chain to S0, given
it starts at (z, 0):
Tz(S0) , inf{t > 0 : (Zt, Nt) ∈ S0, (Zs, Ns) /∈ S0 for some 0 < s < t,
given (Z0, N0) = (z, 0)}.
In the following, we show that Tz(S0) has finite expectation for each z ∈ Z. From this, using the
ergodicity of the resource process, it follows that the return time to a particular state (z0, 0) ∈ S0
also has finite expectation, and hence the chain is ergodic.
To show that Tz(S0) has finite expectation, we use a coupling argument. Given a Markov
chain (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with (Z0, N0) = (z, 0), we construct a coupled process N (1)t ∼
M/M/∞((1 − γ)λ, κ) with N (1)t = 0, as in the proof of Lemma I.2. Define T˜z(0) to be the
first return time to 0 of the chain N
(1)
t . From the construction of the coupling, it follows that
Nt ≤ N (1)t for all t ≥ 0, and hence Tz(S0) ≤ T˜z(0). Thus, we have E[Tz(S0)] ≤ E[T˜z(0)]. The
result then follows immediately from the fact that an M/M/∞((1−γ)λ, κ) queue is ergodic, and
hence E[T˜z(0)] <∞ for all z ∈ Z.
C Joint continuity of the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ)
In the following, we show that the steady state distribution pi(ξ, κ) of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ)
is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in its parameters. This continuity result will play an
important role in subsequent results that constitute our proof of existence of an MFE.
To prove the continuity of pi(ξ, κ), we adopt an approach similar to (Le Van & Stachurski,
2007), where we characterize the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) as a maximizer of a continuous
function, and apply Berge’s maximum theorem. Before we present the formal argument, we
specify the topologies (and the metric) we impose on the set of Markovian strategies and the set
of invariant probability distributions, and specify the continuous function Λ that we consider.
First, we endow the state space S = Z × N0 with the discrete topology. Let Cb(S) denote the
set of bounded function h : S→ R. (Note that since we impose the discrete topology on S, any
such h is also continuous.) We endow Cb(S) with the sup-norm:
‖h1 − h2‖∞ , sup
(z,n)∈S
|h1(z, n)− h2(z, n)| , for h1, h2 ∈ Cb(S) (7)
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Let Π ⊆ Cb(S) denote the set of Markovian strategies, with the topology induced from Cb(S).
We let M(S) denote the set of finite signed measures on S, and we endow M(S) with the
weak topology, which is equivalent to the topology induced by `1-norm since S is countable:
‖µ− ν‖1 =
∑
(z,n)∈S
|µ(z, n)− ν(z, n)|, for µ, ν ∈M(S). (8)
Let Γ = {pi(ξ, κ) : ξ ∈ Π, κ ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ]} ⊆ M(S) denote the set of invariant distributions
(with the induced topology) for all Markovian strategies and arrival rates. Let Γ denote the
closure of Γ.
For ξ ∈ Π, κ ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ] and ν ∈ Γ, define Λ(ξ, κ, ν) as follows:
Λ(ξ, κ, ν) , −
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|(νQ)(z, n)| , (9)
where Q = Qξ,κ denotes the transition kernel of MC(ξ, κ), and νQ is defined as
(νQ)(z, n) =
∑
(y,m)∈S
ν(y,m)Q((y,m)→ (z, n)).
With the preliminaries in place, we are now ready to state the main lemma of this section.
Lemma C.1. The map (ξ, κ) 7→ pi(ξ, κ) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in (ξ, κ) for ξ ∈ Π
and κ ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ].
Proof. In Lemma C.2, we show that the set of distributions Γ is uniformly tight. Then, from
Prohorov’s theorem (Billingsley, 2013), we obtain that Γ is compact. Observe that
arg max
ν∈Γ
Λ(ξ, κ, ν) = {pi(ξ, κ)}. (10)
This follows from the fact that pi(ξ, κ) is the unique probability distribution over S for which
(4) holds.
In Lemma C.3, we show that Λ(ξ, κ, ν) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous its parameters
for ξ ∈ Π, ν ∈ Γ and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ]. The result then follows from a direct application of
Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1963) to (10).
The following two auxiliary lemmas are used in the proof of Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.2. The set Γ of invariant distributions is tight.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a coupling argument. For any ξ ∈ Π and κ ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ],
let (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ), with (Z0, N0) = (z, n) for some (z, n) ∈ S. Let pi denote the invariant
distribution of MC(ξ, κ). Independently, let N̂t ∼ M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ) with N̂0 = n. Let pi
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denote the invariant distribution of M/M/∞(λ(1− γ), βλ); it is straightforward to show that pi
is Poisson with mean β/(1− γ).
Using Lemma I.1 and Lemma I.2, we obtain that Nt is (first-order) stochastically dominated
by N̂t for all t ≥ 0. From this, we obtain (by taking limits and using ergodicity) that for all
k > 0, we have ∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
pi(z, n) ≤
∑
n>k
pi(n).
For any  > 0, choose a k > 0 such that
∑
n>k pi(n) < . (Such a k
 exists, given that pi is
Poisson with finite mean.) This implies that∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
pi(z, n) < , for all  > 0.
Since k is independent of the choice of (ξ, κ), we obtain that Γ is tight.
The following lemma proves the joint continuity of Λ.
Lemma C.3. The function Λ as defined in (9) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous.
Proof. Consider ξi ∈ Π, κi ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] and νi ∈ Γ for i = 1, 2. We let Qi denote the
transition kernel of MC(ξi, κi). We have
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤ |Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)|+ |Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|. (11)
Now, note that
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|(ν1Q1)(z, n)− (ν1Q2)(z, n)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
∑
(y,m)∈S
1
n+ 1
ν1(y,m) |Q1((y,m)→ (z, n))− Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤
∑
(y,m)∈S
ν1(y,m)
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n))− Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤ sup
(y,m)∈S
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n))− Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| . (12)
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Now, using (1), we obtain that
Q1((y,m)→ (z, n))− Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))
=I{z = y, n = m+ 1}(κ1 − κ2) + I{z = y, n = m− 1}λγm(ξ1(y,m)− ξ2(y,m))
− I{z = y, n = m} (κ1 − κ2 + λmγ(ξ1(y,m)− ξ2(y,m))) ,
and hence ∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n))− Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤
(
1
m+ 2
+
1
m+ 1
)
|κ1 − κ2|+ λγ
(
1 +
m
m+ 1
)
|ξ1(y,m)− ξ2(y,m)|
≤2 (|κ1 − κ2|+ λγ|ξ1(y,m)− ξ2(y,m)|) .
Thus, from (12), we obtain
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)| ≤ 2|κ1 − κ2|+ 2λγ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞. (13)
Next, observe that
|Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|(ν1Q2)(z, n)− (ν2Q2)(z, n)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
∑
(y,m)∈S
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| |ν1(y,m)− ν2(y,m)|
≤
∑
(y,m)∈S
|ν1(y,m)− ν2(y,m)|
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| . (14)
Now, again from (1) and after some straightforward algebra, we obtain that
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n+ 1
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤ 2
m+ 1
∑
z 6=y
µy,z + κ2
(
1
m+ 2
+
1
m+ 1
)
+ λ(1− γξ2(y,m))
(
1 +
m
m+ 1
)
≤
∑
z 6=y
µy,z + 2κ2 + 2λ
≤max
y∈Z
∑
z 6=y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ,
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where we have used the fact that κ2 ≤ βλ in the last inequality. Thus, we from (14), we obtain
|Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)| ≤
max
y∈Z
∑
z 6=y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ
 ‖ν1 − ν2‖1. (15)
Therefore, combining (11), (13) and (15), we obtain
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1)− Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤2|κ1 − κ2|+ 2λγ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞ +
max
y∈Z
∑
z 6=y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ
 ‖ν1 − ν2‖1.
Thus, Λ is Lipschitz, and hence jointly and (uniformly) continuous in its parameters.
D Existence of κ satisfying equilibrium condition
In this section we show for any Markovian strategy ξ, there exists a unique arrival rate κ ∈
[βλ(1− γ), βλ] for which the steady state distribution pi of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) satisfies
the equation (6).
Towards that goal, for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, define
φ(ξ, κ) ,
∑
(z,n)∈S
npiξ,κ(z, n)
where piξ,κ is the unique steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ). We seek to show that there exists
a κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] such that φ(ξ, κ) = β. We prove this result using intermediate value
theorem. First, we show that φ(ξ, κ) is a strictly increasing function of κ for any given ξ ∈ Π.
Second, we show φ(ξ, βλ(1−β)) ≤ β and φ(ξ, βλ) ≥ β, which implies any κ such that φ(ξ, κ) = β
must lie in [βλ(1−γ), βλ]. The result then follows once we show φ(ξ, κ) is a continuous function
of κ.
In the rest of this section, we assume that the strategy ξ is fixed, and drop the explicit
dependence on ξ from notation wherever convenient. We now proceed with the first-step.
D.1 Strict monotonicity of φ(·)
Lemma D.1. Given any Markovian strategy ξ, φ(κ) is a strictly increasing function of κ on
[βλ(1− γ), βλ].
Proof. For any κ1, κ2 ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ] with κ1 < κ2, consider two coupled chains
(
Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t
) ∼
MC(ξ, κi) for i = 1, 2, as in the proof of Lemma I.2, where Z
(1)
t = Z
(2)
t and N
(1)
t ≤ N (2)t for all
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t ≥ 0. For i = 1, 2, we have
1
t
∫ t
0
N (i)s ds→
∑
z,n
npii(z, n) = φ(κi)
almost surely as t → ∞, where we write pii for piκi . Since N (1)t ≤ N (2)t for all t, we have
φ(κ1) ≤ φ(κ2).
Next, suppose for the sake of contradiction that φ(κ1) = φ(κ2). Since Z
(1)
t = Z
(2)
t and
N
(1)
t ≤ N (2)t for all t ≥ 0, we have
I{Z(1)t = z,N (1)t ≥ n} ≤ I{Z(2)t = z,N (2)t ≥ n}, (16)
for all (z, n) ∈ S, t ≥ 0.
For any (z, n) ∈ S, we have
1
t
∫ t
0
I{Z(i)s = z,N (i)s ≥ n}ds→
∑
n′≥n
pii(z, n
′) (17)
almost surely as t→∞, for i = 1, 2. By (16) and (17) we have∑
n′≥n
pi1(z, n
′) ≤
∑
n′≥n
pi2(z, n
′),
for any (z, n), and
φ(κ1) =
∑
n≥0
n
(∑
z∈Z
pi1(z, n)
)
=
∑
n≥0
∑
z∈Z,n′>n
pi1(z, n
′) ≤
∑
n≥0
∑
z∈Z,n′>n
pi2(z, n
′) = φ(κ2).
Since by our assumption φ(κ1) = φ(κ2), the inequality in the preceding equation is actually an
equality. This implies ∑
n′≥n
pi1(z, n
′) =
∑
n′≥n
pi2(z, n
′),
for all (z, n), which further implies that pi1 and pi2 are the same distribution.
For i = 1, 2, the equation (4) implies
pii(z, n)
κi +∑
y 6=z
µz,y + λn(1− γξ(z, n))

=pii(z, n− 1)κi +
∑
y 6=z
µy,zpii(y, n) + pii(z, n+ 1)λ(n+ 1)(1− γξ(z, n+ 1)),
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which leads to
κi(pii(z, n)− pii(z, n− 1))
=
∑
y 6=z
µy,zpii(y, n) + pii(z, n+ 1)λ(n+ 1)(1− γξ(z, n+ 1))
− pii(z, n)
∑
y 6=z
µz,y + λn(1− γξ(z, n))
 . (18)
Since pi1 = pi2, the right hand side of (18) is the same for i = 1, 2, hence we have
κ1(pi1(z, n)− pi1(z, n− 1)) = κ2(pi2(z, n)− pi2(z, n− 1)).
But κ1 < κ2 and pi1 = pi2 implies that for i = 1, 2, pii(z, n) = pii(z, n− 1) for all (z, n), hence pii
cannot be a probability distribution over S, and this contradiction completes the proof.
D.2 Bounds for φ(·)
In this section, we provide bounds on the function φ(κ) for any κ > 0. These bounds immediately
imply that for κ = βλ, φ(κ) ≥ β, and for κ = βλ(1− γ), φ(κ) ≤ β. Together with Lemma D.1,
this implies that any κ for which φ(κ) = β must lie in the interval [βλ(1− γ), βλ].
Lemma D.2. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arriving rate κ ≥ 0, φ(κ) satisfies
κ
λ
≤ φ(κ) ≤ κ
λ(1− γ) .
Proof. Let (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ), and (Z0, N0) = (z, n). Denote as M/M/∞(λ, κ) an (indepen-
dent) M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κ and service rate λ, and let N (i)t ∼ M/M/∞(λi, κ) for
i = 1, 2 be two independent processes with N
(1)
0 = N
(2)
0 = n, where λ1 = λ and λ2 = (1− γ)λ.
Let piκ be the steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ), and pii be the steady state distribution
of M/M/∞(λi, κ) for i = 1, 2. We have
1
t
∫ t
0
Nsds→
∑
z,n
npiκ(z, n),
and
1
t
∫ t
0
N (i)s ds→
∑
n
npii(n), i = 1, 2
almost surely as t→∞. From Lemma I.2, we have N (1)t 4sd Nt 4sd N (2)t for all t ≥ 0, therefore
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we have ∑
n
npi1(n) ≤
∑
z,n
npiκ(z, n) ≤
∑
n
npi2(n).
The result then follows from the fact that for i = 1, 2, pii is Poisson distribution with mean
κ/λi.
D.3 Continuity of φ(·)
Observe that the existence of a κ ∈ [βλ(1−γ), βλ] such that φ(κ) = β would follow immediately
once we prove the continuity of φ(·) in κ for any fixed Markovian strategy ξ. In this section, we
prove a stronger statement, namely that φ(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ).
Lemma D.3. The map φ(ξ, κ) is jointly and uniformly continuous in (ξ, κ) for Markovian ξ
and for κ ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ].
Proof. Given Markovian strategies ξ1 and ξ2, and arriving rates κ1, κ2 ∈ [βλ(1− γ), βλ] , let pii
be the steady state distribution of MC(ξi, κi), for i = 1, 2. We have, for any arbitrary k ≥ 0,
|φ(ξ1, κ1)− φ(ξ2, κ2)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z,n
n(pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
n(pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
npi1(z, n) +
∑
z∈Z,n>k
npi2(z, n).
(19)
Now, bounding the first term, we obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤k
∑
z∈Z
∑
n≤k
|pi1(z, n)− pi2(z, n)| ≤ k‖pi1 − pi2‖1. (20)
To bound the other terms, we use a coupling argument. Let (Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t ) ∼ MC(ξi, κi) with
(Z
(i)
0 , N
(i)
0 ) = (z, n) for i = 1, 2. Let N̂t ∼ M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ), with N̂0 = n, denote the
number of agents in an (independent) M/M/∞ queue at time with arrival rate βλ and service
rate λ(1− γ). Let pi denote the steady state distribution of N̂t. By Lemma I.1 and Lemma I.2,
we have N
(i)
t 4sd N̂t for all t ≥ 0 and for each i = 1, 2. From this stochastic dominance, it is
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straightforward to obtain that∑
z∈Z,n>k
npii(z, n) ≤
∑
n>k
npi(n), i = 1, 2. (21)
Thus, from(19), (21) and (20), we have
|φ(ξ1, κ1)− φ(ξ2, κ2)| ≤ k‖pi1 − pi2‖1 + 2
∑
n>k
npi(n).
Now, for any  > 0, choose k such that
∑
n>k npi(n) < /4. (Note that this choice of k is
independent of (ξi, κi) and depends only on the steady state pi of M/M/∞(λ(1− γ), βλ), which
is Poisson with mean β/(1− γ).) Second, from Lemma C.1, we obtain that for any  > 0, there
exists a δ > 0 such that for all (ξ1, κ1) and (ξ2, κ2) such that ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞ < δ and |κ1 − κ2| < δ,
we have ‖pi1 − pi2‖1 < /2k. Taken together, we obtain that for any  > 0, there exists a
δ > 0 such that for all (ξ1, κ1) and (ξ2, κ2) such that ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ < δ and |κ1 − κ2| < δ, we have
|φ(ξ1, κ1)− φ(ξ2, κ2)| < . Thus, we obtain that φ(·) is jointly and uniformly continuous.
D.4 Continuity
For any ξ ∈ Π, let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of κ for which pi(ξ, κ) satisfies (6). Below, we
show that κ(ξ) is a continuous function of ξ.
Lemma D.4. The map ξ 7→ κ(ξ) is continuous.
Proof. Define W (ξ, κ) = −|β − φ(ξ, κ)|. Note that, from Lemma D.1, we obtain
arg max
κ∈[βλ(1−γ),βλ]
W (ξ, κ) = {κ(ξ)}.
From Lemma D.3, we obtain that φ(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ), and hence so is W (ξ, κ).
The result then follows from Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1963).
E Uniform bounds on value functions
For a given ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we seek to study the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw). Before
we proceed, we need some definitions. Let (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and let Eξ(·|z, n) denote the
expectation-operator with respect to {(Zt, Nt) : t ≥ 0} conditioned on (Z0, N0) = (z, n). Fix an
agent, say agent 1, among all the agents at time 0, and let τ be the agent’s first decision epoch.
Let T : Π×R+×Cb(S)→ Cb(S) denote the Bellman-operator for the agent’s decision problem
DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw), where for any ξ ∈ Π, Vsw > 0 and U ∈ Cb(S), the function W = T(ξ, Vsw, U)
is defined as follows:
W (z, n) = F (z, n) + γmax
{
Eξ [U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n] , Vsw
}
, for all (z, n) ∈ S. (22)
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The following lemma states that the map T(ξ, Vsw, ·) is a contraction. The proof follows
from standard arguments and is omitted.
Lemma E.1. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we have T(ξ, Vsw, U) ∈ Cb(S) for all U ∈ Cb(S).
Furthermore, the map T(ξ, Vsw, ·) : Cb(S) → Cb(S) is a contraction (with contraction parameter
γ) for any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0.
Let V(ξ, Vsw) ∈ Cb(S) be the unique fixed point of T(ξ, Vsw, ·). Define Vst(ξ, Vsw) ∈ Cb(S) and
Vsw(ξ, Vsw) ∈ R+ as follows:
Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) = Eξ [V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]
Vsw(ξ, Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Vst(z, n+ 1; ξ, Vsw), (23)
where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)). Here V(z, n; ξ, Vsw) (and Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw)) denote the value taken by
V(ξ, Vsw) (resp., Vst(ξ, Vsw)) at (z, n) ∈ S.
We begin this section by providing bounds on Vsw, Vst and V. Define
V =
1
1− γ ‖F‖∞,
V = exp
(
− β
1− γ
) ∑
(z,n)∈S
βn(1− γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)n+1(n+ 1)!
pires(z)F (z, n+ 1) > 0,
where Ψ = 1λ maxz∈Z
∑
y 6=z µzy ∈ (0,∞), and pires is the steady state distribution of the resource
process. The following lemma, providing a uniform upper bound on the value functions, follows
immediately from definition.
Lemma E.2. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, the value functions satisfy |Vsw(ξ, Vsw)| ≤ ‖Vst(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ ≤
‖V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ ≤ V = ‖F‖∞1−γ .
Proof. Observe that from (23), we have |Vsw(ξ, sw)| ≤ ‖Vst(ξ, sw)‖∞ ≤ ‖V(ξ, sw)‖∞. Also, from
the fact that V(ξ, Vsw) is the fixed-point of T(ξ, Vsw, ·), we obtain
‖V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ ≤ ‖F‖∞ + γmax{‖V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞, |Vsw(ξ, sw)|} = ‖F‖∞ + γ‖V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞.
Rearranging, we obtain that ‖V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ ≤ 11−γ ‖F‖∞ = V.
The next lemma provides a uniform lower bound on the value functions. The proof makes
extensive use of the strong Markovian property for the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)).
Lemma E.3. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we have Vsw(ξ, Vsw) ≥ V.
Proof. Observe that
V(z, n; ξ, Vsw) = F (z, n) + γmax{Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw), Vsw} ≥ F (z, n).
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Recalling the definition of Vst(ξ, Vsw) and using the (strong) Markov property, we obtain
Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) = λ
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
V(z, n; ξ, Vsw)
+
κ(ξ)
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
Vst(z, n+ 1; ξ, Vsw)
+
∑
w 6=z
µwz
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
Vst(w, n; ξ, Vsw)
+
(n− 1)λ(1− γξ(z, n))
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
Vst(z, n− 1; ξ, Vsw)
+
(n− 1)λγξ(z, n)
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw)
≥ λ
nλ+ κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
V(z, n; ξ, Vsw)
≥ λ
λ(n+ β) +
∑
y 6=z µzy
F (z, n),
where the last line follows from the fact that κ(ξ) ≤ βλ. Using the definition of Ψ, we obtain
Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) ≥ 1
n+ β + Ψ
F (z, n) ≥ 1
n(1 + β + Ψ)
F (z, n). (24)
Next, observe that pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies the steady-state equation (4):∑
(y,m)∈S
pi(y,m)Qξ((y,m)→ (z, n)) = 0,
where Qξ denote the transition kernel of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). Using the expression
(1) for Qξ, we obtain
pi(z, n)(κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z
µzy + λn(1− γξ(z, n)))
= pi(z, n− 1)κ(ξ) +
∑
w 6=z
pi(w, n)µwz + pi(z, n+ 1)λ(n+ 1)(1− γξ(z, n+ 1)).
34
This implies that
pi(z, n) ≥ pi(z, n− 1) κ(ξ)
κ(ξ) +
∑
y 6=z µzy + λn(1− γξ(z, n))
≥ pi(z, n− 1) βλ(1− γ)
βλ(1− γ) +∑y 6=z µzy + λn
≥ pi(z, n− 1) β(1− γ)
β(1− γ) + Ψ + n
≥ pi(z, n− 1) β(1− γ)
(1 + β + Ψ)n
.
Thus, we obtain
pi(z, n) ≥ pi(z, 0) β
n(1− γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)nn!
.
Now, from Lemma I.2, we obtain that the process (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) with (Z0, N0) = (z, n)
is stochastically dominated by (Zt, N
(1)
t ) where N
(1)
t is an (independent) M/M/∞(λ(1− γ), βλ)
process with N
(1)
0 = n. Hence, we have pi(z, 0) ≥ pires(z)P(N (1)∞ = 0), where the steady state
N
(1)
∞ is given by a Poisson distribution with parameter β/(1 − γ), implying P(N (1)∞ = 0) =
exp(−β/(1− γ)). Thus, we obtain
pi(z, n) ≥ pires(z) exp
(
− β
1− γ
)
βn(1− γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)nn!
. (25)
Finally, from (23), we have
Vsw(ξ, Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Vst(z, n+ 1; ξ, Vsw)
≥
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)
F (z, n+ 1)
(1 + β + Ψ)(n+ 1)
≥ exp
(
− β
1− γ
) ∑
(z,n)∈S
βn(1− γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)n+1(n+ 1)!
pires(z)F (z, n+ 1)
= V.
where we use (24) in the first inequality and (25) in the second.
F A compact set of Markovian strategies
For ξ ∈ Π and Vsw ∈ [V,V], denote the set of all optimal Markovian strategies for the decision
problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw) by X (ξ, Vsw) ⊆ Π. In particular, X (ξ, Vsw) is the set of all ζ ∈ Π such
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that
ζ(z, n) =
1 if Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) > Vsw;0 if Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) < Vsw.
It is straightforward to show that the set X (ξ, Vsw) is non-empty and convex.
In this section, we provide characterization of a compact set Π̂ ⊆ Π of strategies such that
if ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ∈ [V,V], then X (ξ, Vsw) ⊆ Π̂. This characterization is later used to define a
correspondence over a compact set to which we apply the Kakutani fixed point theorem to show
the existence of an MFE. (Note that the set Π is not compact under the sup-norm.)
We begin by defining the set Π̂. Recall that F (z, n)→ 0 as n→∞ for all z ∈ Z. Let K0 be
defined as
K0 = inf
{
m : F (z, n) <
(1− γ)2
2
V for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ m
}
,
and let K1 be defined as
K1 = inf
{
n : exp
(
−1
8
√
n− 1
)
+
2√
log(n− 1) + γ
b
√
log(n−1)c(1− γ) < (1− γ)
2V
4‖F‖∞
}
Let Kmax = max{4K20 + 1,K1}. Define the set Π̂ ∈ Π as follows:
Π̂ = {ξ ∈ Π : ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax}.
In other words, under any strategy ξ ∈ Π̂, each agent chooses to switch her location, if the
number of agents at her location is greater than Kmax, irrespective of the resource level. It is
straightforward to show that Π̂ is compact, by noting that it is isomorphic to [0, 1]Kmax under
the Euclidean topology.
The following lemma states that if ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V, then the optimal action for an agent
at the state (z, n) is to switch if n ≥ Kmax.
Lemma F.1. For ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V, we have Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) < Vsw for all z ∈ Z and for all
n ≥ Kmax.
Proof. Consider an agent i in location k facing the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ), Vsw) for a
given ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V. Let τ ` > 0 denote the time of the `th-decision epoch of the agent,
for ` = 1, 2, · · · . Let (Zt, Nt) denote the state of the location at time t, and for brevity, we let
(Z`, N`) denote (Zτ` , Nτ`) for each ` = 1, 2, · · · .
Suppose (Z0, N0) = (z, n) for z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax. Fix a strategy φ ∈ Π for the agent, and
let τφ denote the first time at which the agent chooses to switch under φ. Let V φst (z, n) denote
agent i’s continuation payoffs under the strategy φ, subsequent to her making the decision to
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stay and not leaving the system, given the state of the location (z, n). We have the following
expression for the V φst (z, n):
V φst (z, n) = E
[ ∞∑
`=1
γ`−1F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}+ γ`I{τ ` = τφ}Vsw
]
. (26)
The first term inside the expectation denotes the total expected payoff until the agent chooses to
switch, the second term denotes the payoff on switching. Here, the expectation E is conditioned
on (Z0, N0) = (z, n) and on the fact that agent i follows strategy φ and all other agents follow
strategy ξ. (We drop this explicit dependence from the notation for E for brevity.) From this,
we obtain,
V φst (z, n) =
∞∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
+
∞∑
`=1
γ`VswP
(
τ ` = τφ
)
≤
∞∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
+ γVsw.
(27)
Let n̂ = b√n− 1/2 + 1c. For each ` = 1, 2, · · · , we have
E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
= E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
∣∣∣N` ≥ n̂]P(N` ≥ n̂)
+ E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
∣∣∣N` < n̂]P(N` < n̂)
≤ 1
2
(1− γ)2V + ‖F‖∞P(N` < n̂).
(28)
Here, in the inequality, the first term follows from the fact that since n > Kmax, we have
n̂ > K0, and hence F (Z`, N`) <
(1−γ)2V
2 if N` ≥ n̂. In the second term, we have used the fact
that F (Z`, N`) ≤ ‖F‖∞.
To bound P(N` < n̂), consider an auxiliary system with n agents at t = 0 where each
agent other than agent i stays in the system for a time that is independently and identically
distributed as an exponential distribution with rate λ. (We assume agent i never leaves the
auxiliary system.) Furthermore, there are no arrivals to this auxiliary system. Let N˜t denote
the number of agents in this auxiliary system. It is straightforward to show that N˜t is first-order
stochastically dominated by Nt, via a coupling argument and we omit the details here. This
implies that P(N` ≤ n̂) ≤ P(N˜` ≤ n̂), where we write N˜` to denote N˜τ` . Thus, we obtain
E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
≤ 1
2
(1− γ)2V + ‖F‖∞P(N˜` < n̂).
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Let ̂`= b√log(n− 1)c, and t̂ = log(n−1)2λ . For each ` ≤ ̂`, we have N˜` ≥ N˜̂`, and hence,
P(N˜` < n̂) ≤ P(N˜̂`< n̂)
= P(N˜̂`< n̂|τ ̂`< t̂)P(τ ̂`< t̂) + P(N˜̂`< n̂|τ ̂`≥ t̂)P(τ ̂`≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜̂`< n̂|τ ̂`< t̂)P(τ ̂`< t̂) + P(τ ̂`≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜t̂ < n̂|τ
̂`
< t̂)P(τ
̂`
< t̂) + P(τ
̂`≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜t̂ < n̂) + P(τ
̂`≥ t̂),
(29)
where the third inequality follows from the fact that on τ
̂`
< t̂, we have N˜t̂ ≤ N˜̂`, and the fourth
inequality follows from the independence of τ
̂`
and N˜t.
Now, observe that since each agent j 6= i stays in the auxiliary system for a time distributed
independently and exponentially with rate λ, the probability that the agent j 6= i is still in the
auxiliary system by time t̂ is equal to exp(−λt̂) = 1/√n− 1. Thus, the number of agents N˜t̂
in the auxiliary system at time t̂ is distributed as 1 + Bin(n− 1, 1√
n−1), where Bin(·, ·) denotes
the binomial distribution. (Recall that in the auxiliary system, agent i never leaves.) Now, note
that E[Bin(n− 1, 1√
n−1)] =
√
n− 1 > n̂− 1. From this, we obtain
P(N˜t̂ < n̂) = P
(
Bin
(
n− 1, 1√
n− 1
)
< n̂− 1
)
≤ P
(
Bin
(
n− 1, 1√
n− 1
)
<
1
2
√
n− 1
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
√
n− 1
)
,
(30)
where we have used the Chernoff bound (Mitzenmacher & Upfal, 2005) for the lower tail of the
binomial distribution in the last inequality.
Next, note that τ ` ∼ Gamma(`, λ), since τ ` is the sum of ` independently and exponentially
distributed time intervals. Hence, from Markov’s inequality, we obtain
P(τ
̂`
> t̂) ≤ E[τ
̂`
]
t̂
=
̂`
λt̂
≤ 2√
log(n− 1) . (31)
Thus, combining (28), (29), (30) and (31), we obtain for all ` ≤ ̂`,
E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
≤ 1
2
(1− γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
(
exp(−1
8
√
n− 1) + 2√
log(n− 1)
)
.
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Thus, using (27), we have
V φst (z, n) =
̂`∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
+
∞∑
`=̂`+1
γ`−1E
[
F (Z`, N`)I{τ ` ≤ τφ}
]
+ γVsw
≤ 1
1− γ
(
1
2
(1− γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
(
exp(−1
8
√
n− 1) + 2√
log(n− 1)
))
+ γ
̂`‖F‖∞ + γVsw,
where in the inequality, we use that fact that F (Z`, N`) ≤ ‖F‖∞ for all ` > ̂`. Thus, we obtain,
V φst (z, n) ≤
1
1− γ
(
1
2
(1− γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
(
exp(−1
8
√
n− 1) + 2√
log(n− 1) + γ
̂`
(1− γ)
))
+ γVsw.
Now, note that since n ≥ Kmax ≥ K1, we have
‖F‖∞
(
exp(−1
8
√
n− 1) + 2√
log(n− 1) + γ
̂`
(1− γ)
)
<
(1− γ)2V
4
.
Thus we obtain V φst (z, n) ≤ 11−γ
(
(1−γ)2V
2 +
(1−γ)2V
4
)
+ γVsw =
3(1−γ)
4 V + γVsw. Since this in-
equality holds for all strategies φ ∈ Π and since Vsw ≥ V, we obtain Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) < Vsw for all
z ∈ Z and all n ≥ Kmax.
Let Υ = Π̂×[V,V]. The preceding lemma implies that for any ζ ∈ X (ξ, Vsw) with (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ,
it must be the case that ζ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all n ≥ Kmax. From the definition of Π̂, this
implies that X (ξ, Vsw) ⊆ Π̂ for all (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ. Thus, we can view the map (ξ, Vsw)→ X (ξ, Vsw)
as defining a correspondence X : Υ⇒ Π̂.
G Upper-hemicontinuity of R
For (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ, define the map R as R(ξ, Vsw) = X (ξ, Vsw) × {Vsw(ξ, Vsw)}. Note that from
Lemma E.2, Lemma E.3 and Lemma F.1, we obtain that R(ξ, Vsw) ⊆ Υ for any (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ.
This implies that we can view the map R as a correspondence R : Υ ⇒ Υ. In this section,
we seek to show that this correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous. This result directly used in
proof for Theorem 3.1.
To prove this, we first show that the value functions V(ξ, Vsw) and Vsw(ξ, Vsw) are jointly
continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ. In the following, we use the following notation: for U ∈ Cb(S), let
‖U‖∗ , maxz∈Z,n<Kmax |U(z, n)|. Note that ‖U‖∗ ≤ ‖U‖∞.
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Lemma G.1. The map (ξ, Vsw)→ V(ξ, Vsw) is (jointly) continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ.
Proof. For (ξi, V isw) ∈ Υ for i = 1, 2, let Wi(z, n) = V(z, n; ξi, V isw). Using the definition of T
and Lemma F.1, we obtain Wi(z, n) = F (z, n) + γV
i
sw for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax. This implies
that
|W1(z, n)−W2(z, n)| ≤ γ|V 1sw − V 2sw|, for z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax.
This implies that ‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ max{‖W1 −W2‖∗, γ|V 1sw − V 2sw|}. Next, we have
‖W1 −W2‖∗ =‖T(ξ1, V 1sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W2)‖∗
≤‖T(ξ1, V 1sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)‖∗
+ ‖T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W2)‖∗
≤‖T(ξ1, V 1sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)‖∗
+ ‖T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W2)‖∞
≤‖T(ξ1, V 1sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)‖∗ + γ‖W1 −W2‖∞.
where we have used Lemma E.1 in the last inequality. Using the fact that ‖W1 − W2‖∗ ≤
‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ max{‖W1 −W2‖∗, γ|V 1sw − V 2sw|} ≤ ‖W1 −W2‖∗ + γ|V 1sw − V 2sw| and after some
straightforward algebra, we obtain
‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ 1
1− γ
(‖T(ξ1, V 1sw,W1)−T(ξ2, V 2sw,W1)‖∗ + γ|V 1sw − V 2sw|) .
From Lemma G.2, we obtain that the first term in the parenthesis can be made arbitrarily small
by setting ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞ and |V 1sw − V 2sw| correspondingly small enough. Thus, we conclude that
V(ξ, Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ.
The following auxiliary lemma is used in the proof of Lemma G.1.
Lemma G.2. Let (ξm, V msw ) ∈ Υ with (ξm, V msw )→ (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ as m→∞. For any U ∈ Cb(S),
we have ‖T(ξm, V msw , U)−T(ξ, Vsw, U)‖∗ → 0 as m→∞.
Proof. Let (ξm, V msw ) be as in the statement of the lemma, and let Wm = T(ξ
m, V msw , U) and
W = T(ξ, Vsw, U). By definition of T, we have
|Wm(z, n)−W (z, n)| =γ|max{Em[U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n], V msw}
−max{Eξ[U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n], Vsw}|
≤γmax{|Em[U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n]
−Eξ[U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n]|, |V msw − Vsw|},
where we let Em = Eξ
m
. Thus, it suffices to show that the first term inside the maximization
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converges to zero as m→∞ for all z ∈ Z and n < Kmax. Observe that, since U ∈ Cb(S) and τ
is exponentially distributed with parameter λ, we have
Eξ [U(Zτ , Nτ )|z, n] =
∫ ∞
0
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt, Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
=
∫ T
0
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt, Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
+
∫ ∞
T
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt, Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
with similar expressions for ξm in place of ξ. For large enough value of T > 0, the second term
in the last equation can be made arbitrarily small (uniformly for ξ and all ξm). Thus, again it
suffices to show that the first term in the last equation is continuous in (ξ, Vsw) for all z ∈ Z and
n < Kmax and for large enough T .
Now, using the definition (1) of the transition rate matrix Qξ of the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) (and
similarly Qm = Qξ
m
of the chain MC(ξm, κ(ξm))), we obtain that Qm((u, k) → (v, `)) −→
Q((u, k) → (v, `)) as m → ∞ for all (u, k), (v, `) ∈ S. Then, from (Xia, 1994, See pg.
2183, Example 1.1) or (Ethier & Kurtz, 1986, pg. 262, problem 8), we obtain that the mea-
sure Pm(·|z, n, τ = t) converges weakly to Pξ(·|z, n, τ = t). From this, we conclude that∫ T
0 λ exp(−λt)Em[U(Zt, Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt converges to
∫ T
0 λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt, Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
as m→∞. This completes the proof.
The continuity of Vsw(ξ, Vsw) is then obtained as a corollary of Lemma G.1.
Lemma G.3. The value function Vsw(ξ, Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ.
Proof. Recall the definition (23) of Vsw(ξ, Vsw):
Vsw(ξ, Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Vsw(z, n+ 1; ξ, Vsw),
where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). From Lemma E.2, we have
‖Vst(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ ≤ V. Also, note that Lemma C.1 and Lemma D.4 imply that the invariant
distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemma C.2, we obtain that the set of
invariant distributions Γ is tight. These results together imply that it suffices to show that
Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw) is uniformly continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for some
large enough M .
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Let (ξm, V msw ) ∈ Υ with (ξm, V msw )→ (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ as m→∞. We have
|Vst(z, n; ξm, V msw )− Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw)|
≤|Eξm [V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξm, V msw )|z, n]−Eξ[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]|
≤|Eξm [V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξm, V msw )|z, n]−Eξ
m
[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]|
+ |Eξm [V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]−Eξ[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]|
≤|V(ξm, V msw )− V(ξ, Vsw)‖∞ + |Eξ
m
[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]
−Eξ[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]|.
From Lemma G.1, we obtain that as m→∞, the first term converges to zero. Moreover, from
the same argument as in the proof of Lemma G.1, we obtain that Eξ
m
[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n]→
Eξ[V(Zτ , Nτ ; ξ, Vsw)|z, n] asm→∞ for each (z, n) ∈ S. From this, we conclude that Vst(z, n; ξ, Vsw)
is uniformly continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for large enough M .
We are now ready to show that the correspondence R is upper-hemicontinuous.
Lemma G.4. The correspondence R : Υ⇒ Υ is upper-hemicontinuous.
Proof. By definition, R(ξ, Vsw) = X (ξ, Vsw)× {Vsw(ξ, Vsw)} for (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ. From Lemma G.3,
we obtain that Vsw(ξ, Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ, Vsw) ∈ Υ. Thus, it suffices to show that
the correspondence X : Υ⇒ Π̂ is upper-hemicontinuous.
Consider a sequence (ξn, V nsw, ζ
n)→ (ξ, Vsw, ζ) as n→∞ such that ζn ∈ X (ξn, V nsw) for each
n ≥ 0. By continuity of Vst(·), we obtain that if Vst(z, n, ξ, Vsw) > Vsw for some (z, n) ∈ S, then
for all large enough m, we must have Vst(z, n, ξm, V msw ) > V msw , and hence ζm(z, n) = 1. Similarly,
if Vst(z, n, ξ, Vsw) < Vsw, then ζm(z, n) = 0 for all large enough m. Since ζm → ζ, this implies
that ζ(z, n) = 1 if Vst(z, n, ξ, Vsw) > Vsw, and ζ(z, n) = 0 if Vst(z, n, ξ, Vsw) < Vsw. Thus, we
obtain that ζ(z,m) ∈ X (ξ, Vsw).
H Existence of an optimal threshold strategy
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 4.1. We prove this result in two steps: first,
we prove Lemma 4.1, which states that the value function Vst : S → R is non-increasing in
the number of agents n at the location for any fixed resource level z inZ. Second, we show in
Lemma F.1 that limn→∞ Vst(z, n) ≤ γVsw for all z ∈ Z. Therefore there always exists a threshold
strategy in the set of best responses OPT(ξ, κ, Vsw).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We define a partial order 4p on the state space S of MC(ξ, κ) as follows:
for (z1, n1), (z2, n2) ∈ S, (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2) if and only if z1 = z2 and n1 ≤ n2. For any function
f : S → R, we say f is decreasing with respect to 4p if for all (z1, n1), (z2, n2) ∈ S such that
(z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2), we have f(z1, n1) ≥ f(z2, n2).
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Thus, our goal is to show that the value function Vst of DEC(ξ, κ, Vsw) is decreasing with
respect to 4p. We note that the property “decreasing with respect to 4p” is a closed convex
cone property for functions on S, as defined in (Smith & McCardle, 2002). Thus, using their
Proposition 5, we can conclude that Vst has this property if the following two conditions hold:
1. The resource sharing function F is decreasing with respect to 4p.
2. Let (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ). For any (z, n) ∈ S, let ν(z,n) be the probability distribution
of (Zτ , Nτ ) ∼ ν(z,n) conditioning on (Z0, N0) = (z, n), where τ is distributed inde-
pendently as an exponential with rate λ, denoting the first decision epoch of a fixed
agent. Then for any f : S→ R that is decreasing with respect to 4p, it must hold that
E[f(Z,N)|(Z,N) ∼ ν(z1,n1)] ≥ E[f(Z,N)|(Z,N) ∼ ν(z2,n2)] for all (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2).
Since F (z, n) is decreasing in n for each z ∈ Z, we immediately obtain the first condition. We
now show that the second condition also holds using a coupling argument.
Suppose (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2). By using an argument same as that in the proof of Lemma I.2,
we obtain that there exists a coupling of the two processes (Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t ) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with (Z(i)0 , N (i)0 ) =
(zi, ni) for i = 1, 2, such that for all t ≥ 0, (Z(1)t , N (1)t ) 4p (Z(2)t , N (2)t ). Thus, for any f that is
decreasing with respect to 4p we have f(Z(1)t , N
(1)
t ) ≥ f(Z(2)t , N (2)t ) for all t ≥ 0, and therefore
E[f(Z
(1)
τ , N
(1)
τ )] ≥ E[f(Z(2)τ , N (2)τ )], where τ is a distributed independently as an exponential
with rate λ. Since (Z
(i)
τ , N
(i)
τ ) ∼ ν(zi,ni) for i = 1, 2, we obtain the result.
I Coupling results
In this section, we obtain structural properties of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) by coupling the
chain with an M/M/∞ queue.
Let M/M/∞(λ, κ) denote an (independent) M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κ and service
rate λ. We begin with the following simple result which states that a queue with higher arrival
rate and/or lower service rate is more likely to have more agents in the queue. The proof is
straightforward and omitted.
Lemma I.1. Let N
(i)
t , for i = 1, 2, denote the number of agents at time t in an (independent)
M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κi and service rate λi. Suppose N (1)0 = N (2)0 , and one of
the following two conditions holds: (1) λ1 = λ2 and κ1 ≤ κ2; or (2) λ1 ≥ λ2 and κ1 = κ2.
Then, for all t ≥ 0, N (1)t is stochastically dominated by N (2)t , i.e., for all n ∈ N0, we have
P(N
(1)
t ≥ n) ≤ P(N (2)t ≥ n).
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, we frequently compare the MC(ξ, κ) process for two (or more)
different values of (ξ, κ) to show the monotonicity of various quantities. Our next result justifies
these stochastic comparisons. Before we state the lemma, we make the following definition of
stochastic dominance. Let
(
Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t
) ∼ MC(ξi, κi) with (Z(i)0 , N (i)0 ) = (zi, ni) for i = 1, 2. We
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say the process
(
Z
(1)
t , N
(1)
t
)
is stochastically dominated by the process
(
Z
(2)
t , N
(2)
t
)
if
P(Z
(1)
t = z,N
(1)
t ≥ n) ≤ P(Z(2)t = z,N (2)t ≥ n), for all (z, n) ∈ S.
In that case, we denote as
(
Z
(1)
t , N
(1)
t
)
4sd
(
Z
(2)
t , N
(2)
t
)
. Note that this also implies that N
(1)
t is
stochastically dominated by N
(2)
t under the usual sense of stochastic dominance.
Lemma I.2. Let ξ ∈ Π and κ > 0. Let (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ).
1. Let κ0 ≥ κ, and let ξ0 ∈ Π be such that ξ0(z, n) ≥ ξ(z, n) for all (z, n) ∈ S. Then
we have (Zt, Nt) 4sd
(
Z
(0)
t , N
(0)
t
)
for all t ≥ 0, where (Z(0)t , N (0)t ) ∼ MC(ξ0, κ0) with
Z
(0)
0 = Z0 and N
(0)
0 ≥ N0.
2. Let Xit ∼ M/M/∞(λi, κ) for i = 1, 2 be two independent processes with X10 = X20 = N0,
where λ1 = λ and λ2 = (1− γ)λ. Then, we have for all t ≥ 0, (Zt, X1t ) 4sd (Zt, Nt) 4sd
(Zt, X
2
t ).
Proof. First note that the second statement in the lemma is implied by the first. In particular,
let ξ1(z, n) = 0 and ξ2(z, n) = 1 for all (z, n) ∈ S. Then, using the first statement in the
lemma, we obtain
(
Z
(1)
t , N
(1)
t
)
4sd (Zt, Nt) 4sd
(
Z
(2)
t , N
(2)
t
)
, where
(
Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t
) ∼ MC(ξi, κ) with(
Z
(i)
0 , N
(i)
0
)
= (Z0, N0). The second statement then follows directly by the fact that under ξi,
the process
(
Z
(i)
t , N
(i)
t
)
has the same distribution as (Zt, X
i
t) for i = 1, 2.
To prove the first statement in the lemma, we use a coupling argument. We construct two
chains as follows. Let t0 = 0 and (Z0, N0) = (z0, n0) and
(
Z
(0)
0 , N
(0)
0
)
= (u0, v0), with u0 = z0
and v0 ≥ n0. For k = 1, 2 . . . , define the following recursively:
1. Let τk ∼ Exp(∆k) where ∆k ,
∑
y 6=uk−1 µuk−1,y + κ0 + λvk−1. Let tk = tk−1 + τk.
2. Let
(
Z
(0)
t , N
(0)
t
)
= (uk−1, vk−1) and (Zt, Nt) = (zk−1, nk−1) for t ∈ [tk−1, tk).
3. For t = tk, let
(
Z
(0)
t , N
(0)
t
)
= (uk, vk), where
(uk, vk) =

(y, vk−1)
with probability µuk−1,y/∆k, for each y ∈ Z with y 6= uk−1;
(uk−1, vk−1 + 1)
with probability κ0/∆k;
(uk−1, vk−1 − 1)
with probability λvk−1(1− γξ0(uk−1, vk−1))/∆k;
(uk−1, vk−1)
with probability λvk−1γξ0(uk−1, vk−1)/∆k.
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4. Define ζk , nk−1(1−γξ(zk−1,nk−1))vk−1(1−γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)) and ηk ,
(
1−γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)
γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)
)
max(ζk − 1, 0). It is
straightforward to verify that ηk ∈ [0, 1].
5. Let (Zt, Nt) = (zk, nk) for t = tk, where
(zk, nk) =

(uk, nk−1) if uk 6= uk−1;
(zk−1, nk−1 + 1)
with probability κκ0 ;
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability 1− κκ0 ,
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 + 1);

(zk−1, nk−1 − 1)
with probability
min(ζk, 1);
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability
max(1− ζk, 0),
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 − 1);

(zk−1, nk−1 − 1)
with probability ηk;
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability 1− ηk,
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1).
It is straightforward to verify that under this construction, we have
(
Z
(0)
t , N
(0)
t
) ∼ MC(ξ0, κ0)
and (Zt, Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with Z(0)0 = Z0 and N0 ≤ N (0)0 . Furthermore, by construction, we have
zk = uk for all k, and hence Z
(0)
t = Zt for all t ≥ 0.
To show that Nt ≤ N (0)t for all t ≥ 0, we perform induction on k in the above construction.
Note that n0 ≤ v0. Suppose for some k, we have nk−1 ≤ vk−1. Then, from the definition,
we obtain that nk ≤ vk for all the cases, except possibly when (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 − 1)
and (zk, nk) = (zk−1, nk−1). Under this case, if nk−1 < vk−1, then again we have nk ≤ vk.
On the other hand, if nk−1 = vk−1, then together with the fact that zk−1 = uk−1, we obtain
ξ(zk−1, nk−1) ≤ ξ0(uk−1, vk−1), implying that ζk ≥ 1. However, note that if ζk ≥ 1, then the
event where (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1− 1) and (zk, nk) = (zk−1, nk−1) occurs with zero probability.
Thus, we obtain that under all cases, nk ≤ vk. This completes the induction step and hence the
proof.
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